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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
In First Nat. Bank of El Reno v. Salyer, 50 Pac. (Okl.)
.76, the bank asserted a preference against an assignee for the
benefit of creditors as to certain property onAssignment
.for Creditors, which the bank had a 'chattel mortgage, which it
Priority of had failed to record, in spite of a statute declar-
Unrecorded ing unrecorded chattel mortgages void as against
Mortgage the creditors of the mortgagor. The bank replied
-upon the old argument that "the assignee took no higher
rights nor better title than the assignor ;" but the court prop-
erly replied that this rule could not be relied upon to vali-
date a transaction which, but for the assignment, was unques-
tionably invalid by statute. This decision was reaffirmed
upon a rehearing: First Nat. Bank v. Salyler, 50 Pac. 77, the
court admitting that the common law rule was contrary, as
well as the decisions under the United States Bankruptcy Act,
but declaring that the effect of the local statute was to make
the assignee a trustee for creditors.
Following Bruner v. Bank, 37 S. W. (Tenn.) 286 (1896), it
is held in Williams v. Cox, 42 S. W. (Tenn.) 2, (I) that a de-
positor who deposits a check when the bank is
Banks and known by its officers to be insolvent, can recoverBanking,
Deposits in the proceeds if they can be identified; and (2)
Insolvent when the check was collected by a foreign cor-
Bank respondent bank after the failure of the first bank,
it was its duty to transmit them intact to the receiver, and it
will be presumed that this was done, and that the money
which it retained to indemnify it against certain rediscounts
was retained out of money collected before the failure.
Harris v. First Nat. Bank of Johnson City, 41 S. W. (Tenn.)
io84, merely reiterates the principle that a bank which re-
ceives a deposit under circumstances such as those detailed
above will be compelled to refund. The transaction is void-
able on account of the fraud, and the decision logically car-
ries the principle one step further by holding that the deposit
(in this case a certificate on another bank) could be recovered
from a third bank, to which it had been forwarded as collateral
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for a pre-existing debt, which is not enough to constitute the
transferee a bonafide holder for value.
The Court of Chancery of Tennessee, following the trend
of modern decisions, has held that a statute which provided
Power of that a state bank should not own real estate more
Bank to than sufficient for the conduct of its business,
Hold Land unless taken in payment of debts, was not vio-
lated by the bank's taking a mortgage security upon real estate
for the repayment of money loaned: Alexander v. Brummett,
42 S. W. 63.
Where a subordinate lodge of a beneficial order receives
dues from its members, which dues are, according to the con-
Beneficial stitution, laws and by-laws of the order, to be
Association, used only for certain purposes set forth therein,
Dues they become immediately impressed with a trust,
and an appropriation of such dues to any other object is a
breach of the trust: Schubert Lodge, No. .r8, Knights of
Pythias of New Jersey v. Schubert Kranken Unterstuetzungs
Verein etal. (Court of Chancery of Jersey) 38 Atl. 347.
The acceptor of a draft, in terms payable on the completion
of a certain building, is not liable until notified of the comple-
Bill of tion of the building, and interest thereon only runs
Exchange, from the date of such notice: Peck v. Granite State
Interest Provident Association, 46 N. Y. Suppl. (Supreme
Court) 1042. The facts in this case are meagrely reported,
but it is assumed that the court did not mean to intimate that
mere notice of the happening of the condition upon which
the liability of the acceptor attached, obviates the necessity of
presentment of the draft at the acceptor's place of business or
residence. Under the common law interest is recoverable only
by way of damages for a wrong done, and the acceptor has
done none till after his liability attaches, i. e., after presentment
and demand: Anonymous, 6 Modern Rep. 138 (1705). See
Keener, Quasi-Contracts, p. 154.
When a draft is forwarded to a bank by a consignor of
goods, accompanied by a bill of lading to the order of the
Carriers, consignor, the bank is made the agent of the con-
Bill of signor to receive and collect the draft, and to
Lading order the delivery of the goods, and the carrier is
not liable for a conversion of the goods in delivering them to
the proper owner and ultimate consignee, he having paid the
draft to the bank, even though the bill of lading was not pro-
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duced by him; and this notwithstanding the bill of lading
directed the goods to be delivered on production of the same
properly indorsed: Witi v. East Tennessee & W. N. C. R. Co.
et al. (Supreme Court of Tennessee), 41 S. W. io64.
A contract to furnish materials to be used in the erection of
a building, said materials to be delivered in such quantities
Contract, and at such times as required and ordered, is not
Termination terminated at the date of the last delivery; but
of remains in force, in the absence of some act of the
parties to the contrary, until the completion of the work in
which such materials were used. Bristol Brick Works v. King
College (Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee), 41 S. W.
1O69."
The Supreme Court of California has decided that the moral
Consideration, obliaation to pay a debt is sufficient considera-
Moral tion for a promise to pay, made after the debt
Obligation has been discharged by proceedings in insolv-
ency: Lambert v. Schmalz, 50 Pac. 13.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has decided that a railroad
company under contract to transfer maii at certain points on
Implied its road is not.liable on an implied contract for
Contract, services of one, who, also under contract to make
Agency certain transfers of mail, fulfils the company's con-
tract without its solicitation, and also under the impression
that he is performing his own contract; it further appearing
that the railroad company also understood that it was such
person's duty to make the transfers: Johnson v. Boston & A.
R. CO., 38 Atl. 267.
The Supreme Court of Florida has reiterated the principle
that when one person has paid money in discharge of a
liability which he has assumed at the request of
implied another, or by his authority, the law implies a
Promise
promise of indemnity on the part of the latter to
the former: Chamberlain v. Lesley, 22 So. 736.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey has recently held
that a treasurer of a manufacturing corporation can be clothed
Corporation, with apparent authority to endorse for it, by a long-
Endorsement continued course of business with the knowledge
of Paper by and consent of the directors ; and that parties
Treasurer trusting to this apparent authority, although not
receiving the paper on the faith of the previous endorsements,
will be protected. It was further held that, although the
directors may not in fact have known of the endorsements,
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they were chargeable with knowledge of what they easily
might and, in the reasonable performance of their duty, ought
to have discovered: Blake v. Mfg. Co., 38 Atl. 241.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recently decided that
when a corporation stops business owing to insolvency, and ifs
Insolvency, directors adopt a resolution authorizing the presi-
Assets as dent to file a bill in the Court of Chancery to have
Trust Fund its assets administered, a trust ipso facto arises in
favor of all its creditors and no one of them can reap the ad-
vantage of an execution to satisfy his judgment: Memphis
Barrel & Heading Co. v. Ward, 42 S. W. 13. In this case
the general creditors' bill on behalf of the corporation was not
filed till almost an hour after the issuance of an instanter exe-
cution, and the levy under it. In the light of recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, the conclusion of
the Tennessee court would appear to be incorrect. In Graham
v. R. R. Co., 102 U. S. 148 (i88o), it was held that a corpora-
tion owns its property, just as absolutely as an individual does
and can make any disposition of it that it pleases. In Hollins
v. Brierfield Coal Co., 150 U. S. 371 (1893), the same view
was held, and it was further decided that the so-called "trust"
does not arise in favor of creditors until the assets are in the
possession of a court of equity for administration. See, also,
Hospes v. Car Co., 48 Minn. 174 (1892), where Judge Mitchell
,said: "The capital of a corporation is its property. It has the
whole beneficial interest in it, as well as the legal title. It
may use the income and profits of it, and sell and dispose of
it, the same as a natural person. It is a trustee for its credi-
tors in the same sense and to the same extent as a natural
person, but no further." Can it be doubted that a levy under
an execution against an individual, after he has stopped busi-
ness, but before he has executed any trust, deed or assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors would be supported ? See
Clark on Corp., pp. 539-546.
Moss v. Moss [1897], Prob. 263, expressly decides a much
disputed point by holding that concealment by a woman from
Divorce, her husband at the time of her marriage of the
Wife's fact that she is then pregnant by another man is
Concealment not a cause for divorce upon the ground of fraud.
of Pregnancy
at Time of The interesting opinion of Jenne, Pres., declares,
Marriage that "when there is consent no fraud inducing
that consent is material." He criticises the leading American
case to the contrary, Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen, (Mass.) 6o5
(1882), as introducing a novelty into the common law, adopts
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Bishop's criticisms of that decision, and shows that it is imprac-
ticable to carry it out without limitations. His argument is
very strong, and leads to the conclusion that a contrary result
can and should be reached only by careful legislation.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that where a
deed conveyed to the grantee the privilege of backing water
on the land of the grAntor as much as the said
se., grantee may think necessary by a dam on his said
Construction place, the extent of the grant must be measured
of Ancient by the user, and therefore, when, in pursuance of
Deed the above grant, a dam was built a certain height
and so maintained for fifty years, the present owner of the
land on which the dam was built has no right to increase the
height of the same, and thereby to increase the amount of
water backed up upon the property of the plaintiff who claims
under the original grantor: Hogg v. Bailey, 5 Pa. Super. 426.
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Anmerman,
50 Pac. 15, has decided that a statement made by one charged
with a crime under such circumstances that it
Evidence, would probably be inadmissible as a voluntary
Confessions confession, is admissible in evidence against him
if it does not contain a confession of guilt. The prisoner was
charged with robbery and immediately after his arrest, in the
presence of the officer, the district attorney subjected him to a
rigid examination, in the course of which the prisoner admitted
that he had money on the day after the robbery. The district
attorney then said: " If you can explain where you got that
money there may not be any necessity for going on with this
case." The prisoner answered, " I found it." At the trial
the prisoner stated that this statement was not true and that
it had been induced by the hope that he would be released.
This evidence was objected to, but admitted, since the court
were of opinion that while the prisoner had admitted matters
which, when connected with other facts, tended to prove his
guilt, still he had made no direct confession and "the term is
restricted to acknowledgments of guilt."
In Gray v. Noonan (S. C. Arizona), 50 Pac. i 6, a sheriff
had levied on plaintiff's goods as the goods of J. Plaintiff
obtained judgment against the sheriff individually,
Former but afterwards brought the present suit against the
Judgment officer and his bondsmen on their official bond.
The court held that the judgment in the former case, against
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the sheriff personally, was not admissible in the action against
his sureties and himself in his official capacity.
The Supreme Court of California has gone rather far in
approving the use of notes under circumstances which appear
as follows: In an examination of a prisoner in th6
Refreshing district attornev's office before his examination by
Memory . the magistrate, the prisoner's testimony was taken
down by a stenographer and afterward transcribed by him.
At the trial he was allowed to read from the transcribed
notes, as a means of refreshing his memory: People v. Ammer-
man, 50 Pac. 15.
It was decided in American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co.
of London, Limited, v. Mazwell, 22 So. (Fla.) 75 1, (I) that a
married woman who claims property that has been
husband levied on as her husband's, must be held to strict
and Wife,
Post-nuptial proof that it was purchased with her own money;
a gin (2) that a post-nuptial voluntary gift of real estateFraud against
Creditors by husband to wife by deed, which was not re-
corded for ten years, the husband meanwhile retain-
ing the possession thereof, was invalid as against his creditors.
The transaction took place in Georgia prior to 1866, the date
of the first married women's statute in that state; the husband
had originally reduced his wife's money to possession by lend-
ing it on a mortgage, and had bought in this land at a sale
under the mortgage; but it was held, nevertheless, that there
was no implied trust in the land in favor of the wife, which
would support the conveyance to her.
Curiously enough the old law of husband and wife is also
Chose in recalled by Hardin v. Young, 41 S. W. (Tenn.)
Action, io8o. A wife was entitled by will to a one-
Reduction to seventh part of the proceeds of the sale of a piece
Possesion
After Wife's of real estate after the death of a life tenant. She
Death died before the life tenant. It was held that, though
her husband had not during her lifetime reduced this chose in
action to possession, he could properly do so after her death
as her administrator for his own benefit as against her other
heirs.
An admirable exposition of the law of separation agreements
is found in the opinion of Pitney, V. C., in Buttlar v. Buttlar,
Separation 38 At. (N. J.) 300. A husband had defaulted in
Agreement, the payments specified in an elaborate agreement,
Equitable the wife not being able under the New Jersey
Defence statute to sue in a common law action, filed a bill
in equity against her husband to recover arrears. The court
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held that the suit, though brought in equity only for the
reason above stated, was subject to the equitable defence that
he was unable to make the payments because of inability to
rent the real estate, which was his only property, and upon
the expectation of renting which the amount of the annuity
had been based.
Trefethen v. Lynam, 38 Atl. (Supreme Court of Maine) 335,
is the most recent exposition of an ever recurring subject. A
Wife's Estte, wife owned real estate where she both housed her
Liability for family and ran a hotel; from time to time her
Husband's husband, who was a sailor, sent her remittances by
Debts
checks, which were simply deposited in her hotel
account. It was held (i) that the husband's creditors could
hold her estate for the money thus received; (2) that the
burden was upon her to prove, if true, that an equal amount
had been taken out of the firm account to pay family expenses,
which it was her husband's duty to pay; and (3) that, espe-
cially in the absence of a specific agreement, the wife cannot be
allowed for rent of her real estate occupied by her family.
The United States Circuit Court for the Middle District of
Injuncion, Tennessee has recently granted injunctions to
Ticket railroad companies restraining brokerage in rail-
Scalpers way tickets : Nashville, C. & St. L. R. v. McCon-
nell, 82 Fed. 65. See 36 Am. L. REG. & REV. 57 (January,
1897), and 460 (July, 1897).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has decided that the
statement of a petit juror that he had formed an opinion with
Juror, regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused
Competencyof from a conversation that he had held with his
brother, who had been a juror on a former trial in which the
accused had been found guilty on the same indictment, was
not disqualifying, the information thus imparted being hearsay
merely: State v. Williams, 22 So. 759.
The Supreme Court of Maine decided in State v. Bowman,
38 Atl. 331, that the presence of a stenographer in the grand
Grand Jury, jury room while witnesses are being examined in-
Presence of validates the indictment founded on such testi-
Stenographer mony, although the stenographer was there to
take notes by order of the court and retired before the grand
jury commenced their deliberations.
This is in accordance with the policy of the law that the
proceedings had before the grand jury shall be in secret, and
the line is drawn at the threshold.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held recently in
Frank v. MIagee, 22 So. 739 that where property is seized by
the sheriff under a writ directing a sale, and pend-
Fruits and ing his possession, but before sale, a trespasser
Revenues," enters and cuts standing trees, the severance does
Cutting of not make them fruits or revenues of the land, and
Trees if they are still upon the property at the time of
sale, title to them would pass to the purchaser at such judicial
sale as part of the realty. See, in accordance with this view,
Leidy v. Proctor, 97 Pa. 486 (1881); Rogers v. Gillinger, 30
Pa. 185 (1876).
A provision in a lease, that the lessee is not to dispose of
Landlordand any of the produce on the farm until the lessor
Tenant, has received the rent reserved in the lease, and
Lien on certain stock, also part of the leased property,
Products has been wintered through, gives the landlord no
lien as against a creditor of the lessee: Beers v. Field, 38 Atl.
(Supreme Court of Vermont) 270.
In an action for libel for publishing the statement that plain-
tiff, a married woman, had eloped with one R., the chastity of
the plaintiff was given great consideration and a
Cief large verdict for plaintiff resulted. On a motion
Unchastity, for a new trial by defendant, based upon after-
Justification, discovered evidence, it was held that, in spite of
Evidence the general rule that "only the general reputation
of plaintiff can be proven in reduction of damages in an action
of libel," evidence of adulterous intercourse with R. might be
introduced for the same purpose. "By suing for libel she
may not open the door for an examination of all her past
intercourse with any one, but she does invite an inspection of
her relations with R." : Smith v. Matthews, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
(Supreme Court) 96.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has arrayed itself with
those courts which hold that, in the absence of power re-
Life served in the contract, or in the charter or by-laws
Insurance, of the association incorporated into a policy made
Assignment payable to a certain beneficiary, the insured has
no assignable interest: Love v. Clune, 5o Pac. 34.
In the same case it was decided that, where such an asso-
ciation is formed to benefit the heirs or families of the insured,
Enlargement a subsequent compulsory incorporation, under a
of class of statute including "assigns" as benrficiaries, will
Beneficiaries not enlarge the class of beneficiaries so as to
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enable one insured before the change to cut out his heir in
favor of a stranger: Ibid.
The rule that agents of insurance companies generally have
power simply to receive and forward applications, has been re-
Powers o cently applied by the Supreme Court of Okla-
insurance homa in determining the powers of the local
AZents lodges in a mutual life insurance order. Under
the constitution and laws of the Home Forum Benefit Order
it is provided that the local lodge may receive applications for
benefit certificates, and that, if such applications are acceptable
to the lodge and its medical examiner, they shall be for-
warded to the Grand Secretary, who shall submit them to the
Grand Medical Examiner, who has power to accept or reject
the application. It is further provided that no beneficial
certificate shall be binding upon the order until approved by
the Grand Medical Examiner and signed by the President and
Secretary of the order. The plaintiff's husband made appli-
cation for a certificate. He was initiated into the local lodge,
to which he paid initiation fees and dues; but, through the
negligence of some one, the application was not forwarded to
the Grand Medical Examiner until after his death. In reach-
ing the result that there was no contract between the deceased
and the corporation, the court seems to have been somewhat
influenced by the view that the deceased, being a member,
was supposed to know the rules of the order, and could,
therefore, have been under no misapprehension as to the
powers of the lodge as agent of the order: Home, etc., Order v.
Jones, 50 Pac. 165.
In a suit by a- mortgagee of part interest in a ship, in his
own name, on a policy of insurance taken out by the ship's
Marine owners upon the ship, "as well in their own
Insurance, names as for and in the name or names of all and
Defence to
Suit by every other person or persons to whom the same
Mortgagee doth, may or shall appertain in part or in all"
of Ship against, inter alia, perils of the sea and barratry
by master and mariners, the fact that the captain wilfully cast
the ship away is no defence; and the fact that the plaintiff's
riortgagor was the captain, although he had become such
through the act of the plaintiff, does not alter the result. If
the captain be regarded as the captain of the plaintiff, the
latter can recover in respect to a loss by barratry of the master.
If he be regarded as a stranger to the plaintiff, the latter can
recover as for a loss by a peril of the sea: Smnall v. Insurance
Co., [1897] 2 Q. B. 311.
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
per Butler, J., decided, in Phillips v. The Pilot, 82 Fed. i ii,
that a master of a tugboat is justified in assumingMaster and
Servant, that a member of his crew is accustomed to all
Knowledge the ordinary duties required of men on such
of Duties vessels. Therefore, where the master ordered one
of the crew to jump ashore to attach a line, and the person
received injuries by reason of his being unaccustomed to
jumping, the master is not liable unless he had knowledge of
the man's inability to do the act complained of.
In McDonald, Adin'r, v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 27 S. E. 182,
the Supreme Court of Virginia decided that if a brakeman is
Risks aware, on entering a railroad's employ, that he
Assumed by will be obliged to couple with mis-matched coup-
Employee lers, and continues in the service, and frequently
performs that task, without complaining to the master, he
assumes such risk. The peril was as obvious to him as to
the company.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in an interesting case,
recently held that where a party who had a right to a
Mechanic's mechanic's lien takes, as collateral for a portion
Lien, Waiver, of his claim, mortgage bonds of the company
Estoppel against whom the lien is held, this act is presumed
to be a waiver of the lien pro tanto. Such presumption, how-
ever, may be rebutted by testimony of the agreement and
understanding of the parties to the arrangement. However,
where the party who is entitled to the lien advises the com-
pany to execute a first mortgage, and bonds thereunder, a
portion of which he retains as collateral for his debt, and the
balance of which he encourages and aids the company in dis-
posing of in the hope of getting his debt paid by the proceeds
of the sale of such bonds, he is estopped as against bona fide
purchasers of the first mortgage bonds from asserting his right
of lien. There was nothing in the case to show that the pur-
chasers took the bonds relying upon the representation of the
party claiming the lien, but the court put their decision on the
broad ground that a bond cannot be a first mortgage bond
when there is any prior lien, and that, therefore, when the par-
ties claiming the lien, permitted and encouraged the issuance
of first mortgage bonds, they did an act inconsistent with the
idea of the retention of the lien.
It is submitted that this decision goes too far and that the
court was scarcely warranted in finding that the consent and
approval of the party entitled to the lien, to the issuance of a
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first mortgage, was an-authority to issue a first lien. A first
mortgage does not necessarily import a first lien: Bristol,
Goodson Electric, Etc., Co. v. Bristol, Etc., Co., 42 S. W. 19.
A curious contention as to the effect of a mortgage of cor-
porate property, including that to be acquired in the future,
Mortgage was made in the case of Santa Fe Electric Co. 
v.
After- Hitchcock, 50 Pac. (New Mexico) 332. It was
acquired urged with success in the lower court that, as the
Property corporation which gave this mortgage became
merged in another company, the property of the latter was an
accretion of the old company so as to fall within the mort-
gage. This position was, however, not adopted by the Su-
preme Court.
The sale of a business may include the goodMortgage of
Assets of will, but a mortgage of all the assets of a business
Business, does not cover the good-will. So held in Santa
Good-wi. Fe Electric Co. v. Hitchcock, 5o Pac. (N. M.) 322.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a very interesting case, has
recently held that the riparian owner, who owned to the middle
of a navigable stream, and who, therefore, had the
Sti ems use of the water to the middle of such stream, had
Rights of not an exclusive use, but that his rights were
Riparian subordinate to the paramount easement of naviga-
Owners tion by the public. This easement of navigation
includes the right of mooring vessels in the stream, to repair
the same, and to fit and put in machinery after launching, and
the riparian owner, beyond whose shore line such vessels are
moored, cannot, in the absence of special injury shown,
recover damages. This right, however, to moor vessels does
iot extend to the use of the riparian owner's land not covered
by water, and therefore, where a ship builder brings his cables
across the fiver bank and fastens them on the land of a ripa-
rian proprietor, ahd insists uipon a right to cortinue such use,
an injunction will be granted to restrain such use, although
no injury is proved, and the land is unimproved: Pollock v.
Clevelanrd Shipbuilding Company, 47 N. E. 582.
The Court of Appeal, Queen's Bench Division, has held
that a right of owners of fishing boats, yachts, and other
Foreshore boats, to erect permanent moorings on the soil 
of
Rights, the foreshore of a tidal or navigable stream, for
Immemorial the purpose of attaching their vessels thereto,
Easement could be supported either as an ordinary incident
of navigation over such water or on the ground that the ima-
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memorial usage of such a right which was found as a fact by
the jury, justified the presumption of a legal origin, either by
grant from the Crown or by some subsequent owner of the
foreshore : Attorney General v. Wright, [I897] 2 Q. B. 318.
According to the New York Supreme Court as found in
their decision in Jonas v. Long Island R. Co., 47 N. Y. Suppl.
Negligence, 149, a trial court is not bound to take judicial
Stopping notice that a train can be brought from motion to
Train With
a "Jerk," a state of inertia without impact or "jerk" of
Judicial some degree. Therefore, where the plaintiff fell
Notice from the train as a result of a "jerk," in bringing
the train to a standstill, he is not entitled to recover,
unless some evidence is offered to show the "jerk " was avoid-
able with the exercise of reasonable care, or that the "jerk"
was of more than ordiiary violence.
Where one firm procures an order for another and before
Partnership, the goods are delivered to the purchasers, a mem-
Agency, ber of the former firm dies, his estate is not re-
Death sponsible to the latter firm for the purchase money
-collected after his death: Friend v. Young, [1897] 2 Ch. 421.
The Circuit Court of the Northern District of New York
has held that where a patentee sleeps on his rights for fourteen
Patents, years he has no standing to sue for an infringe-
Infringement, ment of his patent, as his right is lost by his own
Lches laches. The fact that the co-owners of the patent
had no faith in its validity, and declined to prosecute suits for
infringements, is no excuse for or justification of such laches, as
-the plaintiff could have proceeded alone and made his co-owners
,defendants, if they had declined to join as plaintiffs: Richard-
son v. Osborne, 88 Fed. 95.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has considered a
number of questions under the Act of May 12, 1887, which
Practice, effected a marked change in procedure in this
Essential of state. The statute provided, inter alia, that the
Statement of declaration shall consist of a concise statement of
Plaintiff's
Demand the plaintifi's demand,which "shall be accompanied
by copies of all notes, contracts, book entries
- . upon which plaintiff's claim is founded." In a recent
appeal the record showed that an action of assumpsit was
brought to recover from the defendant, as a guarantor, an
.amount alleged to be due by a principal debtor for goods sold
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and delivered to him by the plaintiff. A copy of an undated
contract or undertaking, signed and sealed by the defendant,
was annexed to the plaintifi's statement. Accompanying this
was what purported to be a copy of the paper, on which the
defendant's undertaking was endorsed. This last copy, how-
ever, was a blank form of order'for bicycles, addressed to the
plaintiff, containing blank spaces, evidently intended to be used
in specifying the kind, quantity, values, etc., of the goods to
be ordered. The only written words which the order con-
tained were the signature of the person giving the order and
the words "quantity and specifications already sent in."
Chief Justice Sterrett, in his opinion, cited Byrne v. Hay-
den, 124 Pa. 170 (1889), and Bank v. Ellis, 16i Pa. 241
(1894). He quoted from the latter: "To entitle plaintiff to
judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence, the
statement of his demand must be self-sustaining-that is to
say, it must set forth, in clear and concise terms, a good
cause of action-by which is meant such averments of fact
as, if riot controverted, would entitle him to a verdict for the
amount of his claim . . . All the essential ingredients of
a complete cause of action must affirmatively appear in the
statement and exhibits -which are made part thereof." The
Chief Justice further said, referring to the provision of the
statute above recited: "This is not merely directory-it is
absolutely imperative; and if the copy of the written or
printed contract on which the action is founded, or any part
thereof, does not accompany the statement, and its absence
is not satisfactorily accounted for, the omission cannot be
supplied by averments of the contents or substance of the
missing paper. Without the defendant's consent such aver-
ments cannot be accepted as the legal equivalent of the ' copy'
or ' copies' required by the Act, except in the case of papers
shown to have been lost or destroyed." It was held that the
statement was incomplete and insufficient, and defendant was
not bound to answer it: Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, I8I Pa. 382
(1897).
In connection with the foregoing case we may notice one in
the State of New York. The Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
insufficient vision, Third Department, in a per curiam opinion
Statement on October I, 1897, decided that the following
statement was insufficient to meet the requirements of Section
1274 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under doctrines estab-
lished in Wood v. Mitchell, 117 N. Y. 429:
"This confession of judgment is for a debt and liability justly
due to the said plaintiff, arising upon the following facts, viz.,
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being for a balance due for goods, wares, and merchandise
sold and delivered to me, Fred. C. Greene, by the plaintiff,
William W. Blackmer, and remaining unpaid and unreceived."
The above section of the Code provides that the statement
"must state concisely the facts out of which the debt arose,
and must show that the sum confessed therefor is justly due,
etc.": Blackmer v. Greene, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 113.
A provision in a note promising to pay, in addition to the
Promissory principal sum, "the further sum often per cent. upon
Notes amount found due" in case suit was brought' on
Promise to
Pay Attor- the note, does not render the note non-negotiable:
ney's Fee Salisbury v. Stewart, 49 Pac. (Utah) 777.
Probably in accord with the weight of authority: See Sperry
v. Horr, 32 Ia. 184 (1871), accord; and Woods v. North, 84
Pa. 407 (1877), contra.
A note, payable to the maker's order, had on the back of it
the following: "Pay to the order of , to whom we
guarantee payment, etc." Names of the payee
Guarantee were signed below the guarantee. Held, an in-
dorsement: Byers v. Bellan-Price Ins., 5o Pac.
(Col.) 368. The maker and the payee being the same, the
guarantee wa.-i meaningless and could be stricken out. The
general rule is that a guarantee by a payee or any sub-
sequent party to a bill or note will not operate as an endorse-
ment thereof. See Belcher v. Smith, 7 Cushing, 224 (185 I),
and note thereto in Ames' Cases on Bills and Notes, Vol. I.,
p. 225.
Where a creditor accepts his debtor's note in payment, on
the strength of an indorsement made for that purpose, his
relinquishment of his right to proceed against the
Indorsement, maker, upon the pre-existing debt, furnishes a con-
sideration as against the indorser, though the note
is payable on demand: Kelly v. Theiss, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 145
(Supreme Court). The debtor's note being taken in payment
and not as security for the debt, the creditor becomes a pur-
chaser for value: Brown v. Leavitt, 31 N. Y. 113 (1865).
The rule is otherwise in New York, if the note is taken as
security for the debt: Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johnson's Ch.
Rep. 54 (1821).
An action for money had and received cannot be maintained
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by a corporation to recover a sum received by a former director
as a bribe for resigning his office and procuringQuasi
contracts, control of the corporation to be turned over to the
Money Had purchaser for corrupt purposes.
*ad Received The only remedy of a corporation in such a case
is an action to recover damages for the fraud practised upon it
by the director: McClure v. Law, 47 N. Y. Suppl. (Supreme
Court) 84.
Indebitatus assumpsit can only be elected as a remedy for
those torts in the commission of which the tort-feasor has
enriched himself at the expense of the plaintiff by taking or
using the plaintiff's property: See Phillips v. Iiomfray, 24 Ch.
Div. 439 (1883).
" Money had and received," will lie against mortgagee who
'has received more money in payment of mortgage than the
mortgage actually called for. The mortgagor
Money Paid may have this action, even though he has also an
on mortgage action against his agent, who fraudulently so paid
.he over amount: Tewatsch v. Cooney, 47 N. Y. Suppl. (Su-
.preme Court) 541.
This is an ordinary example of the quasi-contractual right
.to recover money paid under mistake. See Keener on Quasi-
..Contracts, Chap. II.
In Miller v. Roberts, 47 N. E. 585, the plaintiff conveyed
his farm to a third person, for the benefit of defendant, in con-
sideration of defendant's oral promise to convey
Dettt An to him another farm. The defendant refusing to
Contract, convey, the plaintiff was permitted to recover to
Statute of the extent of the benefit conferred upon the de-
Frauds fendant, even though the defendant's promise was
,non-enforcible by reason of the Statute of Frauds, and, further-
'more, -hat -even though the plaintiff had received, prior to the
breach, from the defendant certain articles of personal prop-
erty as part of the consideration for his conveyance, for though
,he must account for their value, yet he was not bound to re-
-turn the same before bringing suit, as the plaintiff had not
rescinded the contract.
The duty of a defendant under a contract non-enforcible by
reason of the Statute of Frauds is to make restitution of the
benefits received by the plaintiff's performance: See Dowling
v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478 (1878), for the principles appli-
cable to this doctrine.
Where a county, liable for expenses, has paid expenses,
'790
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for a part of which by special act a separate court house dis-
trict was liable, the payment is not voluntary, and
Money Pad, can be recovered from the court house district:
Recovery Canpbell County v. Commissioners of Court House
District, 42 S.W. (Ky.) i i i. This is an example of the rule that
where a plaintiff pays the claim of a third person existing
against both the plaintiff and the defendant, but which should
be paid by the defendant, the plaintiff may recover the same
from the defendant as money paid to the defendant's use:
Brown v. Hodgson, 4 Taunton, 189 (I81 I).
Plaintiff's son was killed while acting as brakeman on de-
fendant's train, by being struck by a derrick which had been
Railroads, erected over the track by defendant, and of whose
Negligence, existence decedent was aware. Defendant con-
erricks tended that "it is not negligence in a railroad
company to construct or permit to be constructed overhead
hanging bridges, etc., over its tracks so low as not to permit
a brakeman to stand upright on the top of a box car. Lower
court took this view and held complaint insufficient; but the
Supreme Court in sending the case back to the jury, declared,
"it is rare that abstract principles of law are so fixed :and
absolute as not to be modified or controlled by the special
facts of the case to which they are sought to be applied:"
Gmsinan & Caffery Cent. Refinery v. Railroad Co., 22 So. (La.)
742.
Though an altogether unprofitable decision to the general
Receiver's practitioner, First Na ipnal Bank of Canton v.
Personal Washbfrn, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 117, is of value as
Liabiiity a reminder that a receiver who unnecessarily
for Costs opposes an honest claim may make himself per-
sonally liable for the resulting costs.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has decided that when,
Religious under the rules and discipline of a religious organ-
societies, ization, a "call" to the pastorate of a church owing
Contract of allegiance to such organization, is not effective
Pastorate until formally sanctioned by the presbytery thereof,
such call not so sanctioned creates no civil contract: First
Presbyterian Church of Perry v. Myers, 50 Pac. 70.
Where goods are shipped C. 0. D., and the consignee re-
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fused to accept them, but after a lapse of ten months, during
which time no agreement was reached, the con-
Delivery, signor agrees to accept the consignee's note for
Liability the goods and to "arrange to turn the goods
for Loss over," the consignee is not liable on the note, or
for the value of the goods, he having failed to receive them
through the fault of the carrier in whose custody the goods
-were: Cole v. Rankin (Court of Chancery Appeals of Ten-
nessee), 42 S. W. 72.
The stranding of the "St. Paul" on the New Jersey coast
on the 24th of January, 1896, excited a great deal of interest
throughout the country, and the successful man-
stvage ner in which the passengers, mails and cargo were
removed, and finally the vessel itself extricated from its pre-
dicament but a few days before some violent storms, is prob-
ably well remembered. Considering that the vessel was valued
at over two million dollars, and the cargo, consisting largely
of specie, at nearly that amount, and that pretty much the
whole wrecking force of the eastern coast was engaged in the
work, the decree of $ i6o,ooo for the salvage services seems
quite moderate. This case applies the well-recognized prin-
ciple that the community of interest between the vessel and
her cargo ceases upon the unloading of the latter, and, as that
was accomplished at the end of the first four of the eleven
days required for the entire task, the cargo was charged with
a little less than two-elevenths of the whole award: The St.
Paul, 82 Fed. 104. (Dist. Ct., S. D. of N. Y.)
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has lately ruled on
an important and, indeed, fundamental question of law which
seems never before to have been adjudicated, viz.,Search
Warrant, the time in which a search warrant must be exe-
Time of cuted when no time is fixed by the terms of the
Execution warrant itself. The court in the case in which
the question arose decided that the warrant (which authorized
a search for intoxicating liquors), in the absence of reasons for
the delay, became functus officio after a reasonable time; that
what was a reasonable time was a question for the court; and
that three days having elapsed in this case the warrant could
not be lawfully executed: State v. Gutirie, 38 AtI. 368.
Where there is a running account between two parties, cer-
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tain items of wvhich are barred by the Statute of Limitations,
Statuteof a payment of a portion of the amount due, unap-
Limitations, propriated by the debtor to the items barred, will
Acknowledg- not toll the statute as to those items. But it may,
ment of Debt with tihe other circumstances of the case, be evi-
dence of the intention of the debtor in making the payment.
Thus where, apart from the statute-barred items, the amount
due at the time of payment is less than the amount of that
payment; where the payment is stated to be " on account,"
and made expressly with reference to a statement of account
including the statute-barred items, the court will treat it as an
acknowledgment of an account on which a balance greater
than the amount paid will be due; and will imply a promise
to pay that balance : Friend v. Young, [ 1897], 2 Ch. 42 1.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has decided
that, under a statute forbidding the construction and exten-
Street sion of street railways, except on a finding by the
Railways, court that public convenience and necessity re-
Appication quire such construction or extension, the appli-
to Construct cants' financial ability to build such railway is a
circumstance to be considered. In re Shelton Street Railway
Co., 38 Atl. 362.
The rule that equality is equity, usually determines the
liability of sureties inter se; but where, as in Pile v. McCoy,
41 S. W. (Tenn.) 1052, the guardian's default is
Suretyship, occasioned by his paying his personal debt to one
Contribution of the sureties out of his ward's estate, the inno-
cent surety, if. compelled to make good the guardian's de-
fault, can recover the whole amount from his co-surety, who
caused and received the benefit of that default.
It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Nevada that
the net earnings of a railroad, forming the basis of valuation
Taxation, for taxation, are determined by deducting the
Railroad, necessary expenses, under reasonably economical
Reduction of and prudent management, from the gross earnings
Expenses under similar management; and that a reduction
of $13.839 in the pay roll of a railroad during 1896, coupled
with proof that no more officers and employes were necessarily
required in 1895 than in 1896, will justify a jury in finding
that the actual expenses during 1895 could have been reason-
ably reduced $13,839: State v. Virginia & T. R?. Co.,4 9 Pac.
945-
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A will provided that the testator's daughter should be en-
titled to receive a certain share of the income of a residuary
Will, trust estate on condition that she should remain
Legacy, on the continent of Europe during the lifetime of
Void her husband (who resided in New York), unless
Condition absolutely divorced from him. The New York
Supreme Court in interpreting this provision declined to
recognize the validity of the superadded condition and affirmed
the well settled rule that a condition attached to a legacy
which tends to separate husband and wife, and to compel
them to live apart, is void, as opposed to public policy: Crug'r
v. Phelps, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 61.
The Court of Chancery in England, In re Groom, [1897],
2 Ch. 407, has recently been called upon to interpret a will
containing a bequest by a testator of £4ooo to his trustees
will, "in trust for the two children of W. in equal
littoaClass, shares as tenants in common, to be paid to them
Mistake as on respectively attaining the age of twenty-one
to Number years, or marrying under that age." At the time
the bequest was made W. had four children living. It was
held, following Lee v. Pain, 4 Hare, 249 (1849), that the four
children were entitled to take equally, the word " two " being
rejected upon the presumption of mistake.
It is well to note, however, that the rule may be overthrown
when there are circumstances from which inferences can be
drawn as to the particular children intended to be benefited,
as was the case in Newman v. Piercy, 4 Ch. Div. 41
(1876); and also that the rule is not extended to a bequest to
an individual or the children of an individual when there is
more than one in existence answering to the description of the
individual, such bequest being void for uncertainty, as was
held in In re Stevenson, [1897], I Ch. 75.
